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Abstract  
The difficulty of holding fair elections continues to be a critical problem in many newly 
democratized countries. The core of the problem is the electoral administration’s lack of political 
autonomy and capability to regulate fraud. This paper seeks to identify the conditions for 
establishing an autonomous and capable electoral administration system. An electoral 
administration system has two main functions: to disclose the nature of elections and to prevent 
fraud. We argue in this paper that an autonomous and capable electoral administration system 
exists if the major political players have the incentive to disclose the information on the elections 
and to secure the ruler’s credible commitment to fair elections. We examine this argument 
through comparative case studies of Korea and the Philippines. Despite similar historical and 
institutional settings, their election commissions exhibit contrasting features. The difference in 
the incentive structures of the major political players seems to have caused the divergence in the 
institutional evolution of the election commissions in the two countries. 
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1. Introduction※ 
 
Holding regular elections is one of the key conditions for democracy. But this is not a 
sufficient condition. Elections also need to be fair to guarantee that political 
competition is played out appropriately.  
 
Securing fairness in elections is, in fact, still a crucial problem in many of the newly 
democratized countries, which are mostly developing countries. Even though an 
authoritarian regime collapses and democratic transition takes place, this does not 
necessarily simultaneously bring fairness in elections. If elections are manipulated 
systematically by the ruling party, the regime is called electoral authoritarianism. Even 
if there is no systematic manipulation, elections are sometimes influenced by the elites 
through bribes and fraud. This is not rare in the cases of newly democratized countries. 
The manipulation of elections or prevalence of fraud is actually a problem of the 
electoral administration system. The electoral administration systems in new 
democracies are not necessarily autonomous enough to insulate themselves from the 
pressure of dominant political players, and not capable enough to regulate electoral 
irregularities (López-Pintor [2000]).  
 
Nevertheless, there are cases among new democracies where fair elections have been 
attained through politically autonomous and efficient electoral administration systems. 
Democratic regimes in these countries have become consolidated through such an 
electoral administration.  
 
Why does such divergence in electoral administration systems take place? What are the 
conditions that make the electoral administration system autonomous and capable, 
especially in new democracies? These are the main questions examined in this paper.  
                                                   
※ The authors thank Yutaka Onishi, Yutaka Shinada, Noriyo Isozaki, Kengo Soga, and 
Cleo Calimbahin for their useful comments. This work is supported by the 
Grants-in-Aid for Science Research (B) (No.20330027) and the Grants-in-Aid for 
Science Research (A) (No.23243022). 
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We argue in this study that such an electoral administration system is established if the 
major political players have the incentive for it, in other words, if the major political 
players find establishing such an electoral administration system as the best strategy 
for maximizing their payoffs. Among the major political players, the player who holds 
the power plays a crucial role in deciding the type of electoral administration system.  
 
In discussing the incentive structure, we consider that information exposure about the 
nature of elections through an electoral administration is very important, in addition to 
the prevention of electoral fraud. An autonomous and capable electoral administration 
system emerges when the player in power needs to disclose the nature of elections 
(which usually are fair) to avoid the costs caused by the opposition’s protest. And such 
an electoral administration is sustained when the players continue to see that this 
function as well as fraud regulation serve their interests.  
 
To examine this argument, we compare the cases of Korea and the Philippines, two 
countries sharing similar settings. Both experienced democratization in the 1980s, have 
similar forms of government, and electoral administration systems with similar 
institutional settings. Nonetheless, the electoral administration systems of these two 
countries have diverged in actual functions. The Korean election commission 
strengthened its political autonomy and regulatory power, while the Philippine election 
commission suffers from manipulation and inefficiency. We expected that this 
divergence would provide an empirical base for determining the conditions of an 
autonomous and capable electoral administration system.  
 
In the following sections, we will present the theory of the electoral administration 
system as a self-enforcing institution. We will then examine it through the cases of 
Korea and the Philippines. 
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2. The Electoral Administration as a Self-Enforcing Institution 
 
The recent literature on dictatorship deals with cases where democratic institutions 
including elections are utilized by dictators to augment their rule (Schedler [2006], 
Magaloni [2006], Levitsky and Way [2010], Magaloni and Kricheli [2010]). The 
electoral administrations under these examples of “electoral authoritarianism” or 
“competitive authoritarianism” are designed to produce results which always favor the 
ruler. Such a system, controlled by the ruler, is neither fair nor neutral.  
 
Even under democratic regimes, the electoral administration system is not always 
autonomous and capable enough to regulate electoral processes. Table 1 indicates that 
25 among one 115 electoral democracies (21.7 percent) in 2010 show a relatively 
lower level of fairness in the electoral process1.  
 
Table 1 Electoral Democracies in the World as of 2010 
Total number of countries 194  
Number of electoral democracies  115  
Total percentage of electoral democracies  59.3%  
Number of electoral democracies with a lower score in its 
electoral process*  
25 
Percentage of lower quality electoral democracies in total 
electoral democracies  
21.7%  
* The number of countries with an “electoral process” that scores either 8 or 9. Below 
                                                   
1  Freedom House defines an electoral democracy as having: 1. a competitive, 
multiparty political system; 2. universal adult suffrage for all citizens; 3. regularly 
contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy with reasonable ballot 
security, the absence of massive voter fraud, and with results that are representative of 
the public will; and 4. significant public access of major political parties to the 
electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning. See 
Freedom House Methodology. The 25 countries with lower scores in their electoral 
process are: Albania, Bangladesh, Benin, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Comoros, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Lesotho, Liberia, Macedonia, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Montenegro, 
Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, 
Tanzania, Ukraine, Vanuatu, and Zambia. 
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8 is not classified as an electoral democracy. The range of scoring is from 0 to 12.  
Source: Freedom House. 
 
Even where there is no systematic control by the ruling parties, the electoral 
administration systems in some of the new democracies suffer from inefficiency in 
preventing electoral fraud. In the worse cases, election officers themselves violate 
electoral rules or commit crimes of nonfeasance. 
 
The nature of an electoral administration system is decided primarily by a country’s 
legal framework, constitution and statutes. Actual management is determined by the 
system’s personnel and the budget allocated to it. The ruling administration generally 
has the power to appoint management officers and initiate amendments to statues. In 
this sense, the ruling administration has the power to determine the nature of the 
electoral administration. If so, logically, the ruler prefers to keep room for electoral 
manipulation because he can use government resources for election purposes, 
something which sometimes constitutes electoral fraud. As long as the electoral 
administration is controlled by the ruler, these problems by and large are not 
uncovered2. 
 
Yet there are cases where the rulers institutionalize autonomous and capable electoral 
administrations and minimize the room for their own electoral manipulation. Why do 
some rulers act in such a way? This seemingly contradictory behavior can be 
understood as the ruler’s solution for the commitment problem which imposes certain 
costs on him.  
 
To use a simplified example, we suppose that an election is a two-player game of the 
ruler and the opposition. When elections are held, the results will be either the ruler 
winning and maintaining power or the opposition winning and replacing the ruler (see 
                                                   
2 In the following, “the ruling party”, “the ruling administration”, and “the ruler” are 
used interchangeably. Here “the ruler” does not imply a dictator. 
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the appendix for a formal modeling).  
 
If the opposition wins the elections, there is little probability that the partiality of the 
electoral administration would be questioned. The opposition finds no merit in 
criticizing the elections that it has won. The ruler finds it difficult to claim that he was 
cheated in manipulated elections because as ruler he was in the advantageous position 
of being able to influence the elections using the power and resources in the 
government.  
 
On the other hand, the ruler sometimes faces a problem if he wins the election. If the 
opposition has no information on the nature of the election, it can claim that the 
election was rigged by the ruler and that the opposition was the true winner. Whether 
or not the opposition claims it was the actual victory depends on the degree of its 
subjective probability of the fairness of the election.  
 
The ruler incurs the costs if the opposition takes protest action that damages the 
legitimacy of the ruler’s administration. Such action also often triggers street 
demonstrations and causes political instability and economic stagnation. The ruler 
additionally needs to carry the costs of repression.  
 
As long as the ruler possesses enough political resources to counter the opposition’s 
protests, he does not need to change the electoral administration system. In some cases 
the ruler has the means to counter protests effectively, such as influencing the media to 
claim his legitimacy, using police authority to subdue street demonstrations, or 
co-opting opposition members through his party machine. However, the ruler faces a 
crisis if he does not have enough capacity to counter the opposition’s protests, or if the 
opposition is cohesive and has enough political resources. If the ruler sees the credible 
and critical threat of the opposition beforehand, he prefers the strategy of holding a fair 
election rather than having a frontal clash in a rigged election.  
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A serious problem the ruler faces is the case where the opposition’s subjective 
probability is of a rigged election even though the ruler actually held a fair election. If 
the electoral administration system is not autonomous from the ruler or not competent, 
the opposition has no means to know the real nature of the election. Moreover, the very 
continuation of such an incompetent electoral administration system itself strengthens 
the opposition’s doubt about the elections. As long as there is a room for such doubt, it 
is likely that the opposition will attack the ruler by claiming the unfairness of elections. 
The more the political resources the opposition has to confront the ruler, the higher the 
probability that it will take protest action. 
 
The action that the ruler can take to prevent the costs of opposition protest is to reveal 
information showing that the election was fair. For this purpose an autonomous and 
capable electoral administration system is established. Such an electoral administration 
system affirms the ruler’s pre-commitment to fair elections which will present the 
opposition with difficulties in strengthening its protests against the ruler3. Aside from 
the exposure of information, an autonomous and capable electoral administration 
system also prevents or at least decreases fraud. The more the electoral administration 
has the power to guard against fraud, the stronger the commitment of the ruler to fair 
elections.  
 
Information revelation also works in favor of the opposition in solving its coordination 
problem. The opposition faces a collective action problem as it is usually composed of 
various groups (Olson [1971]). It is difficult for the opposition to impose a credible 
threat on the ruler if it is divided and the groups do not share the same evaluation of the 
nature of elections. Weingast [1997] claims that having a focal point is crucial in 
                                                   
3 International election monitoring also seems to reveal the nature of the election. 
However, due to its limited coverage, international monitors do not guarantee rulers’ 
commitment to fair elections in many cases. Beaulieu and Hyde [2009] show 
empirically that international monitors increase the probability of the opposition’s 
boycott because the opposition believes that it would face more difficulty competing in 
an election that is fraught with concealed electoral manipulation and has international 
legitimacy. 
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solving this coordination problem. Historically constitutions have served as the focal 
point. In the modern context, especially for newly democratized countries, it is 
elections that play the role of focal point4. Elections are the opportunity for the citizens 
to feel the newly brought democracy arising from the collapse of dictatorship. This 
means, conversely, that ambiguity in the nature of election benefits the ruler. Hence, 
the ruler has the incentive to create an autonomous and capable electoral 
administration system only if the opposition has immense resources or is very cohesive 
in the first place regardless of the information on elections.  
 
Thus, the high probability that the ruler will obtain lower payoffs by not revealing 
information on the nature of elections is the fundamental condition for the ruler to 
choose the strategy of establishing an autonomous and capable electoral administration 
system. This condition is prepared if the opposition has the high subjective probability 
to view elections as rigged and take protest action, and if the ruler feels he would incur 
large costs from opposition protests (political instability and economic damage) which 
would drastically diminish the benefits deriving from power. In addition, the ruler has 
the larger incentive to hold fair elections if he has the high probability of winning such 
elections5.  
 
The condition here is mainly induced based on the costs caused by the opposition’s 
protests. However, there is also the possibility of the ruler introducing a capable 
electoral administration in order to reduce the costs of rigging elections, for example, if 
he faces the problem of bloating bribery costs. This situation takes place when both the 
ruler and the opposition can commit fraud, and the level of fraud goes up due to 
intensified competition.  
 
                                                   
4 Przeworski [1999] and Fearon [2006] discuss the aspect of information and the role of 
elections in democratic stability.  
5 Magaloni [2010, p.752] provides essentially the same conditions for the one type of 
democratic transition from electoral authoritarianism. This paper shares the similar 
theoretical approach, though we deal with the issue of democratic consolidation rather 
than democratic transition.  
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An autonomous and capable electoral administration is sustainable as long as the ruler 
and opposition have the mutual incentive to control fraud. But the probability of the 
ruler winning the next elections may not always be high. In this situation, the “stakes 
of politics” particularly matter as Przeworski [1991] claims. If the benefits derived 
from holding power are huge, the ruler is tempted to make sure he wins regardless of 
the means of acquiring power, and he loses the incentive to hold fair elections. On the 
other hand, the opposition also sees that acquiring power is the supreme purpose 
beyond the fairness in the elections. An autonomous and capable electoral 
administration would not be an equilibrium in such a situation. If the “stakes of politics” 
are low, or if the major players, even the opposition, can reserve a certain share of the 
“stakes of politics” (Weingast [2006]), the players prefer accepting the loss in elections 
rather than rigging the elections or protesting which have costs. 
 
We expect mainly two alternative explanations. One is that which focuses on the norm. 
This explanation claims that an autonomous and capable electoral administration 
system is established when the norm of clean elections is shared by the major political 
players. Such an administration system is not possible of course when people do not 
believe that elections should be fraud free. Even in the societies where people prefer 
clean elections, there still are cases where electoral administration systems do not 
function to prevent fraud. The crucial player who decides the nature of the electoral 
administration system is primarily the ruler. In this first explanation, the ruler needs to 
be strongly motivated by the norm of clean elections even if it does not serve his/her 
interests. This argument still seems weak in its explanatory power. 
 
The other explanation stresses the role of historical contexts. This argues that path 
dependence is the basic mechanism of institutional evolution. In this explanation, 
institutions that appear at a critical juncture determine the type of institutions that 
follow (Thelen [1999]). The critical juncture for post-democratization institutions is 
naturally that of democratization. Hence, in this argument an electoral administration is 
determined by how democracy is brought about and what institutions then emerged. 
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This stance emphasizes that the constitutions enacted at the time of democratization 
decide the type of electoral administration system which in turn functions as the 
starting point for the following evolution of the institutions.  
 
The argument of critical juncture provides some important insights. As we will see in 
the cases of Korea and the Philippines, the way they experienced democratization is 
closely related with the institutional design of the respective electoral administration 
systems. If holding fair elections itself constitutes the process of democratic transition, 
an autonomous and capable electoral administration system is expected to be created at 
the time of democratization. If democratic transition is caused by uprisings of the 
opposition (or by a splinter group from the ruling coalition), there is no chance for such 
an electoral administration system to emerge at the time of democratization. For the 
former type of democratization, it is likely that fair elections continue to constitute the 
focal point even after democratization. On the other hand, for the second type of 
democratization, establishing an autonomous and capable electoral administration 
system depends on the situation in the post-democratization period. In this sense the 
critical juncture sets the conditions for the evolutionary path of institutions.  
 
Nevertheless, the players’ incentive structure still matters. The formation of institutions 
at a critical juncture can be explained as the equilibrium of the players’ interaction at 
that point. Furthermore, whether or not the institutions established at the critical 
juncture continue to exist depends on the players’ incentives after democratization. 
Institutions may be changed once the players’ payoffs change. Needless to say, the cost 
of changing the institutions should also be taken into consideration. The cost usually 
induces inertia. 
 
In the following section, we will deal with the cases of Korea and the Philippines.  
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3. Comparative Case Studies of Korea and the Philippines 
 
As mentioned above, Korea and the Philippines share some similarities. Both of them 
experienced democratization in the 1980s, have presidential systems, and have 
constitutionally autonomous electoral administrations. On the other hand, the actual 
natures of their electoral administration systems have diverged in their institutional 
evolution. Korea’s National Election Commission (NEC) gained strong autonomy and 
large regulatory power, while the Philippines’ Commission on Elections (COMELEC) 
suffers from the intervention of elites and organizational inefficiency. Comparing these 
similar but contrasting cases seems fitting for examining the conditions for an 
autonomous and capable electoral administration. 
 
Fair elections were the focal point in Korea for its democratic transition because the 
opposition was able to impose a credible threat to the ruler. The major players’ 
interaction brought about an autonomous and capable electoral administration as an 
equilibrium. Also, unsynchronized electoral cycles for the selection of the executive 
and legislature since democratization have functioned to sustain a strong NEC as 
institutional “insurance” in the sharing of power for both the ruler and the opposition. 
At the same time the nationalization of political competition has caused local 
politicians to share the same incentive structure as the national leaders which have 
supported the continuity of the autonomous and capable electoral administration 
system. 
 
By contrast, the democratic transition in the Philippines was brought on by coup 
attempt and citizen uprising. Thereafter an autonomous and capable electoral 
administration system was not established. Instead, a half-way compromise of allowing 
monitoring by private groups was introduced which still continues to be the case6. The 
major players in the post-democratization period have not had the incentive to reform 
                                                   
6 In addition, each particular party was also granted the right to field its own observers 
to monitor elections. 
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COMELEC, and electoral fraud has continued to exit.  
 
(1) Korea 
Korea’s post-independence political history can be divided into three periods, namely, 
a democratic period until 1972, an authoritarian period under presidents Park 
Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan (the Yusin Regime and the Fifth Republic) from 1972 
to 1987, and a democratic period since 1987. National elections have been held 
continuously even during the authoritarian period, although during that period 
presidential elections were indirect. As of July 2010, the elective offices in Korea 
totaled 4,291and were composed of the president, members of the unicameral National 
Assembly, chief executives and local assembly members of the two levels of local 
government, and education board chairs and members of the upper level of local 
government.  
 
The NEC has been managing the electoral administration since the onset of the second 
period of democratization and enjoys autonomous status and strong regulatory power. 
Legally the NEC was established by the 1960 Constitution (the Second Republic) as a 
constitutional body to “administer fair elections”. Except for the number of members, 
the organizational structure and functions have been modified under the five 
succeeding constitutions (the 1962, 1969, 1972, 1980 and 1997 Constitutions). But its 
legal status as an independent constitutional body, not under the control of the 
president, the National Assembly, the judiciary or the Constitutional Court, has been 
sustained7.  
                                                   
7  The 1987 Constitution sets forth the hierarchy of the electoral administration 
managed by the NEC in order to “administer the matters related to elections, 
referendums, and political parties” (Article 114, Section 1). The NEC is composed of a 
chair and eight members. Under the NEC each upper level local government, lower 
level local government, and community level administration has an election 
commission. The members of the NEC are appointed by the president, the National 
Assembly and the Supreme Court Chief Justice. Each appointer has the power to select 
three members. The chair is elected by mutual vote. NEC members have a six-year 
term, which is longer than the president’s term (five years) and the National Assembly 
members’ term (four years). The chair cannot stay in office for more than one term. 
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The NEC’s function is not limited to administrating the electoral process. It has the 
power to initiate electoral reform through setting reform agendas, to enforce the laws 
regulating fraud, and to make semi-judicial judgments on the eligibilities of candidates.  
 
Beyond its legal framework, the NEC has actual autonomy and strong influence. The 
major political players as well as the citizenry recognize the capability of the NEC for 
securing fair elections. There was a symbolic incident of the NEC’s political autonomy 
in 2004. It released a statement that incumbent president Roh Moo-hyun’s calls for 
support of the ruling Uri party ahead of the legislative election in April that year 
constituted a violation of the Election Law. The law requires the president to maintain 
political impartiality. It should be noted also that in terms of resources, the number of 
personnel provided to the NEC and the size of its budget increased dramatically after 
democratization in 1987. 
 
The NEC has acquired and maintains its autonomy and capability because the major 
political players have come to see that such a strong election commission serves their 
interests. Three factors have contributed to the establishment of such an autonomous 
and capable electoral administration. First, the opposition has been an imposing 
credible threat. Second, the unsynchronized electoral cycles for the president and the 
National Assembly made for a fair and strong NEC to provide “insurance” for the 
sharing of power. Third, the nationalization of political competition caused local 
politicians to share the same incentive structure as the national leaders. 
 
The opposition’s credible threat was visible when democratization took place in 1987. 
In the process of democratic transition, the revival of a directly elected president was 
the critical issue. The constitutional amendment to bring about such elections became 
the target of the democratization movement. Since this target, achieving a minimal 
                                                                                                                                                     
The political independence and status of the NEC members are also guaranteed by the 
Constitution (Article 114, Section 4 and 5). 
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democratic procedure, was clear and simple, it effectively functioned as the focal point 
for the opposition to coordinate its movement. Therefore, the probability of an 
opposition uprising was quite high. The probability and the potential leverage of such 
an uprising was confirmed by an actual incident in June 1987. The killing of a student 
leader, Park Jong-chul, triggered a large political uprising called the June Democracy 
Movement.  
 
The opposition’s credible threat push the authoritarian president Chun Doo-hwan to 
allow his ally, Roh Tae-woo, who was a retired army general and the president of the 
ruling Democratic Justice Party, to promise democratic reform (the June 29 
Declaration). The main point the Declaration was revival of direct presidential 
elections. The opposition leaders, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, accepted Roh’s 
concession. The middle class also supported the move, while the labor sector 
demanded further democratization and intensified its movement. 
 
Once democratization has been declared, the next stage was to institutionalize the 
“pact” between the ruler and the opposition, under the continuing threat from the 
opposition. The institutionalization of a democratic government was the drafting of the 
new 1987 Constitution (Cho [2004]). The writing of this constitution was carried out 
by a closed-door “eight-member political meeting” where the leader of the ruling 
Democratic Justice Party and the opposition leaders participated. The draft was later 
approved by the National Assembly and ratified by national referendum. When the 
elite agreed on their pact in the “eight-member political meeting”, it made certain the 
schedule of elections and election related reforms. These started from the direct 
presidential election in December 1987, then electoral reforms for the National 
Assembly elections, and finally the National Assembly elections in April 1988. But it 
was hard to predict the outcomes of the elections.  
 
At this point, it was expected that if the elections were held in a fair manner, the 
opposition would be divided. The opposition leaders, the middle class, and the labor 
14 
 
sector would not be able to form a cohesive coalition against the ruling party. The 
ruling party would enjoy the preferable situation. But if it were believed that the 
election were rigged, it was expected that the opposition would be united and pose a 
critical threat to the ruling party, in which case the ruling party would face a crisis even 
if it won the elections.  
 
Korea had in fact experienced the collapse of a ruling administration caused by 
fraudulent elections in 1960. President Syngman Rhee, then incumbent, supported his 
ally Lee Gi-bung as vice-presidential candidate in those elections8. Rhee himself had 
no problem in getting reelected, but he rigged the election to make Lee the winner. Lee 
was expected to succeed the aging Rhee in the near future, but the opposition 
Democratic Party claimed that the election had been fraudulent and, therefore, invalid. 
Citizens joined the Democratic Party’s movement, and President Rhee was eventually 
expelled from power. He sought exile in Hawaii while Lee and his family committed 
suicide.   
 
The ruler faces the critical threat of protest by the opposition if the nature of elections 
is questioned. The opposition’s threat in Korea has been credible through actual protest 
experience. In this context it was a rational choice for President Chun Doo-hwan and 
Roh Tae-woo to commit themselves credibly to fair elections in order to prevent the 
costly protest of the opposition led by Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam. Having an 
autonomous and capable NEC was the solution to the commitment problem. 
 
The unsynchronized electoral cycles of the president and the National Assembly are 
the second factor behind the establishing and sustaining of an autonomous and capable 
NEC. This explains why the NEC has increased its autonomy and capability under the 
1987 Constitution despite having the same constitutional status under the authoritarian 
1980 Constitution. The power and status of the NEC changed because the provisions 
for other offices and their interaction changed.  
                                                   
8 Each election was held separately though voting was conducted simultaneously.  
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Under the democratic regime of the Third Republic (the 1962 Constitution), the terms 
of the president and members of the National Assembly were four years and their 
elections were held nearly simultaneously9. In this electoral cycle the winner of the 
presidency was also expected to hold the majority in the National Assembly. On the 
other hand, under the democratic regime of the current Sixth Republic (the 1987 
Constitution), the president’s term is five years, while the term of the National 
Assembly members is four years; and election cycles are not matched. Simultaneous 
elections are also impossible as the months of elections are not close (December and 
April). This setting has increased the probability of divided government, since the loser 
in the presidential elections may take the National Assembly, and vice versa. 
 
The ruling party finds that securing fair elections under the unsynchronized electoral 
cycles of the president and the National Assembly works as insurance to reserve 
certain stakes in power. Even if the ruling party’s candidate does not win a presidential 
election, it has the chance to gain a certain share of the seats in the National Assembly 
as long as the NEC guarantees fair elections. In fact, the loser of the presidential 
election has a high possibility of winning a majority in the following the National 
Assembly elections since the ruling party tends to lose its popularity during its term in 
power. In this sense, the unsynchronized electoral cycle with an autonomous and 
capable electoral administration system bars a “winner-take-all” type of political 
competition. Likewise, the current opposition has a greater chance of winning the next 
elections under a strong NEC. Hence, it is preferable for the opposition to accept the 
electoral results under an autonomous and capable NEC rather than always claiming 
that the elections are rigged.  
 
The actual political process took the following course. The first presidential election 
following 1987’s democratization was a three-cornered race. Roh Tae Woo from the 
ruling party ran against two opposition leaders, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. 
                                                   
9 The National Assembly elections were held one month after the presidential election.  
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Roh won the race, succeeding Chun Doo-hwan. The defeated opposition leaders did 
not claim that the election had been fraudulent. Later the opposition gained the 
majority in the succeeding National Assembly elections. A divided government 
emerged for the first time in Korean political history. After President Roh Tae Woo, 
both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung assumed the presidency one after the other. 
An autonomous and capable NEC served the interest of each player. Roh Tae Woo was 
able to win while avoiding an uprising of the opposition through the NEC’s fair 
electoral management. The opposition leaders were able to secure the majority in the 
National Assembly also due to the NEC’s management, though they had lost in the 
earlier presidential election. Eventually the two opposition leaders had their chances to 
be president, again through the fair elections administered by the strong NEC.  
 
It is also important that the president is not allowed to run for reelection under the 1987 
Constitution. After a term of five years, he has to step down. Even if a president were 
successful in amending the Constitution to prolong the presidenial term, the 
amendment would not be applicable to the incumbent president as the Constitution 
prohibits such an application. Hence, the president has no incentive for rigging 
elections and none for hindering fair elections after his term. It could be argued that a 
new candidate of the ruling party might be regarded as the alter ego of the incumbent 
president. If so, the president might have the incentive to rig the elections for this 
successor. Countering this possibility is the tendency of a new candidate to keep his 
distance and point out how he differs from the incumbent who has often lost popularity 
by the end of his term.  
 
Finally, in addition to the credible threat of the opposition and unsynchronized 
electoral cycles of the executive and legislature, another notable factor is that political 
competition has become nationalized, even for local elections. Democratization 
expanded electoral competition to the local level, especially under President Kim 
Young Sam’s administration. Since 1995 local elections have been held simultaneously. 
These elections are for the chief executives and local assembly members of both the 
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upper-level and lower-level of local governments. As local elections do not 
synchronize with the national elections, they are regarded as the preliminary skirmish 
of the national elections. This setting makes voters focus on national issues even for 
local elections, and party affiliation matters more than a candidate’s individual 
personality. With political competition nationalized, the incentives of local politicians 
are set by the national level competition among the parties rather than the personal vote 
at the local level. Local politicians follow the decisions of the national leaders of the 
parties. As long as the national political players have incentives to have an autonomous 
and capable NEC, local politicians share the same incentives.  
 
Aside for the aforementioned incentive based explanation, the role of norms is 
sometimes pointed out as a key for making a strong electoral administration (Anderson 
[2007]; Asaba, Onishi and Tatebayashi [2010]). The example of Korea shows that the 
norm does not emerge in a vacuum. The incentive structure which promotes the loser’s 
consent and the winner’s self-restraint is crucial for making such a norm function, and 
this is provided by the constitutional framework in Korea.  
 
Path dependence and the sequence of events are also often viewed as explanatories. 
The pattern of democratization in Korea, which was democratization with the pact 
between the political elite, is seen as the main cause for the rise of the autonomous and 
capable NEC. But how such an NEC was sustained and even strengthened is explained 
by the incentive structure in the post-democratization period. The key has been the 
divided government caused by unsynchronized electoral cycles. As divided 
government has become the general pattern in Korean politics since 1987, it has 
become increasingly important for the president and the opposition to secure fair 
elections. Without a strong NEC, the power balance between the ruling party and the 
opposition would be affected, and the ruling party could become permanently in power 
with the opposition unable to gain power. This very likely would again bring 
destabilizing protests from the opposition. Through amendments of the NEC law, both 
players have strengthened the power of the NEC. In this process the NEC has 
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expanded its functions from mere electoral administration to semi-legislative and 
semi-judicial functions. As repeated elections have taken place, the unsynchronized 
electoral cycles are proving to provide a certain share of the political stakes to the 
opposition. This has consolidated the incentive structure for the political players to 
comply with the electoral administration, and an autonomous and capable NEC 
constitutes the equilibrium. 
 
(2) The Philippines 
The political history of the Philippines after independence from the US in 1946 can be 
divided into three periods: the democratic period from 1946 to 1972, President 
Ferdinand Marcos’ authoritarian regime from 1972 to 1986, and the return to 
democratic government after 1986. Although President Marcos suspended elections in 
the early part of his authoritarian rule, other than that hiatus, elections have been held 
continuously in the Philippines since its independence. The elective offices range from 
the president to local municipal councilors and all are directly elected. The total 
number of elected officials, for example, in the 2004 general elections was 17,660 and 
50,160 candidates ran for the posts (NSCB [2006]).  
 
Although the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the Philippines’ electoral 
administration agency, is stipulated in the Constitution as an independent organization, 
it has been seen as politically dependent and less capable even after the 1986 
reestablishment of democracy10. Calimbahin [2009: 3] points out three major problems 
with COMELEC. First, political and economic elites maintain patron-client relations 
                                                   
10  COMELEC is a constitutional body which is autonomous from the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches. It is composed by a chair and six commissioners who 
are appointed by the president for a term of seven years. Reappointment is not allowed. 
The chair and the commissioners must be 35 years old or older, have a college degree, 
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately 
preceding elections. The majority of the members including the chair must be members 
of the Philippine Bar and have been practicing law more than 10 years. Under the 
central office managed by the chair and the commissioners there is a hierarchy of 
regional election directors, provincial election supervisors, and election officers (cities 
and municipalities). As of 2010 their total was 1,714 officials. (The COMELEC official 
web site) 
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with the bureaucracy of COMELEC and influence its work to secure results preferable 
to elite interests. Second, patron-client relations persist within COMELEC itself, and 
such relations function to maximize the personal interests of the bureaucrats. Third, 
COMELEC suffers from organizational inefficiency and incapacity. Calimbahin’s 
findings support the widely accepted perception that COMELEC is not an effective 
and autonomous electoral administration body. Although there have been some reforms 
like allowing citizen’s groups to monitor electoral processes and introducing an 
automated vote counting system, these have not been able to solve the problem of 
unfairness adequately11.  
 
Not surprisingly, the authoritarian Marcos regime rigged elections to maintain its rule, 
and a variety of electoral fraud was observed during the period. Even after the 1986 
democratization, such fraud has continued to exist. The Parish Pastoral Council for 
Responsible Voting (PPCRV), a private election monitoring organization, provides a 
manual to volunteers on how to monitor elections, in which various techniques of 
cheating are listed. These are: vote buying, intimidation, illegal use of indelible ink, 
kidnapping, changing the location of polling places without notice, accompanying 
voters to influence their voting, delisting or transferring voters from the voter lists, 
snatching ballot boxes, misreading the content of ballots in counting, and more 
(PPCRV [2007]). This manual indicates that there is a large amount of fraud and 
rigging in Philippine elections committed by candidates of either and all parties and by 
election officers12.  
 
Aside from the regular street level fraud, there have been big election scandals. In the 
1995 elections it was reported that votes for some senatorial candidates were 
transferred to other candidates through manipulation in the counting process. This was 
called the “Dagdag-Bawas” (vote shaving-adding) scandal. Apparently such 
manipulation is not possible without the involvement of COMELEC officers. 
                                                   
11 See also IFES [2009] for the problems of COMELEC. 
12 See also Patino and Velasco [2004] for election related violence in the Philippines.  
20 
 
 
In 2005 President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s involvement in electoral manipulation 
was reported. She was the incumbent president when she ran for the same post in 2004, 
an election which she won. The 1987 Constitution bans reelection of the president, but 
Arroyo was allowed to run because as vice president she had assumed the presidency 
when President Joseph Estrada was forced to resign in the middle of his term. A tapped 
telephone conversation was exposed a year after the election. The media reported that 
the conversation took place between President Arroyo and a COMELEC commissioner 
in which the President asked about her votes. This “Hello Garci” Scandal triggered the 
mass resignation of cabinet members and the Arroyo administration’s approval rating 
plunged sharply13. 
 
Why has the Philippines not been able to establish an autonomous and capable 
electoral administration? When compared with Korea, democratization in the 
Philippines was different. President Marcos decided to hold a presidential election in 
1986 to counter the increasing pressure for regime change. But unlike in Korea, 
Marcos and the opposition did not form a pact for transition. Instead they confronted 
each other. Although Marcos allowed the National Movement for Free Elections 
(NAMFREL), a citizen’s group, to monitor the election, he still tried to rig it using 
various state resources including COMELEC. The president’s payoff would be 
drastically reduced if he were to lose the election and be out of power. Losing power 
did not simply mean that he would no longer be the president; it would mean that he 
would be prosecuted and his wealth would be sequestered. His family and cronies 
would be affected too; and, importantly, he was not sure if he could win the election. 
Even though the probability of an opposition uprising was high, and the costs of such 
an uprising were large, Marcos still expected to obtain higher payoffs through a 
fraudulent election.  
 
The government changed after democratization, but the conditions for an autonomous 
                                                   
13 See Tuazon [2006] for a documentation of electoral fraud in the 2004 elections. 
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and capable electoral administration continue to be insufficient. The president is the 
most crucial player for reforming the electoral administration. The president has the 
power to appoint the commissioners of COMELEC. This appointment is crucial 
because the reform of COMELEC depends on who become commissioners, as these 
appointees have the primary power to decide COMELEC’s management. The president 
also can initiate institutional reforms if he prefers. Through these powers the president 
can decide the nature of COMELEC. However, the president has no incentive to 
change the electoral administration because the Constitution bans him/her from being 
reelected. Even maintaining party strength after a politician’s presidential term does 
not have the similar effects of reelection because political parties are weak and fragile 
in the Philippines and retired presidents have no means of influencing the incumbents. 
Therefore, the president has neither the incentive to rig elections nor to introduce 
electoral reforms.  
 
The senate is not cohesive. An efficient electoral administration benefits only some 
members, but not all. Senators are elected in a bloc-vote system by the national 
constituency. In this setting senators are divided into two groups, those who have high 
popularity based on their public image and those who are not so popular but have the 
financial resources to get elected. The former have the incentive to establish an 
efficient electoral administration because they have a high probability of winning 
under a fair election setting. The latter prefer a less neutral and inefficient electoral 
administration as they think they can control the process to create favorable results for 
themselves. Due to this cleavage, there has been no active argument for reform of 
COMELEC except for the introduction of automated vote counting.  
 
The House of Representatives prefers to retain a patronage-driven COMELEC to 
control the electoral process in the members’ local districts. Most of the representatives 
are elected from single member districts where they play the role of the ruler along 
with the governors and mayors. These representatives can be regarded as a whole as 
local politicians or local rulers. They are allowed to run for reelection, and in many 
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cases family members succeed to their position and power. The opposition may have a 
high subjective probability of cheating and may protest in some areas, but such protests 
seem not to impose huge costs on the local rulers. It is rather easier for them to subdue 
protests, when limited in a certain locality, through the state apparatus of the police and 
military or private resources like private armies. More importantly, the stakes of 
politics at the local level are high because of the large regulatory power in the hands of 
the incumbents. The local representative districts are like the personal domains of the 
local politicians who can monopolize or at least strongly control the economic activity 
in their areas. The high stakes discourage local politicians from observing fair elections 
and accepting their loss should they fail to be reelected. In addition, even though the 
local ruler may have the high probability of winning in a fair election, he is indifferent 
to the nature of the electoral administration as long as protests do not matter. 
 
In short, the opposition’s protests have not been a credible threat to the major political 
players in the Philippines due to the term limit of the president and the local politicians’ 
strength in their narrow domains. Furthermore, the “stakes of politics” for the local 
politicians are large. 
 
There was actually an attempt under President Corazon Aquino, the first president after 
the 1986 democratization, to reform COMELEC and improve its performance. This 
move may be explained by Aquino’s normative concern for clean elections. She 
appointed a succession of reform-minded lawyers to the chair of COMELEC,14 but 
this effort was not able to transform COMELEC into a more efficient body.  
 
There have been some successful endeavors outside COMELEC to secure fair 
                                                   
14 Hilarion Davide, Jr. (1988-1989), Haydee Yorac (1989-1991), and Christian Monsod 
(1991-1995). Davide was a prominent lawyer and later was appointed Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court. Yorac was a law instructor at the University of the Philippines and 
a human rights lawyer. Monsod was the Secretary General of NAMFREL. These 
appointments were intended to improve the capability of COMELEC and to revamp its 
bureaucracy (Calimbahin [2009]: 6-13). 
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elections. The most well-known activity has been election monitoring by private 
organizations, like the quick count of NAMFREL which operates in vote counting in 
parallel with COMELEC. In the official count in the 1986 snap presidential election, 
President Marcos was “officially” proclaimed the winner based on the COMELC count, 
but the quick count of NAMFREL showed that Aquino was leading (Wurfel [1988]: 
300). Such a discrepancy strengthened the people’s belief in electoral manipulation 
which eventually provided the legitimacy to their popular uprising. NAMFREL gained 
a reputation as the guardian of fair elections and continued its quick count operations. 
The government has also amended the election law to give legal status to such private 
watchdogs in the electoral process15. This is seen as the ruler’s strategic choice to 
uphold NAMFREL’s participation in order to avoid collusion in its oppositions. Were a 
president to remove NAMFREL from the electoral process, it would likely send the 
signal that he intends to rig elections16.  
 
In addition, an automated counting system was introduced in the 2010 general 
elections. Since the start of elections under American colonial rule, voters in the 
Philippines had been required to write the names of candidates on the ballots. The 
ballot became very long because all elected offices, from the president to municipal 
councilors, were elected simultaneously, and some positions were elected by bloc 
voting. Such a voting system created a huge amount of manual work in counting17 and 
                                                   
15 The basic law for elections in the Philippines is the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 
881), which was enacted under the Marcos regime in 1985 just before the 1986 snap 
presidential election. The Code provides for the official participation of citizen’s 
groups in the election process. The Code still function as the fundamental statute 
though some amendments have been made. In 1995 the Code was amended, and 
citizen’s groups gained the right to obtain official copies of election turns.  
16 Aside from NAMFREL, the PPCRV was established by Catholic groups in 1995 to 
provide voters education and to monitor the election process. The Social Weather 
Stations (SWS), a private poll organization which was established in 1985, initially 
aimed to contain electoral manipulation through disclosing poll results. Actually 
NAMFERL came to be viewed as more partisan after 1986, and it was not accredited 
to operate in the 2010 elections; the PPCRV was the only citizen’s group to work as a 
monitor. 
17 At a counting site, which is usually a voting place, each ballot was read, and the 
numbers of votes were manually recorded on tally sheets. COMELEC then aggregated 
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such an aggregation process provided opportunities for manipulating the numbers. The 
Dagdag-Bawas scandal in 1995 and the Hello Garci scandal in 2005 took place 
because such opportunities have been so widespread. To minimize such manipulation, 
vote counting was automated in the 2010 elections, thirteen years after the automation 
law was enacted. Voters now use mark sheets and the sheets are read by machines. The 
voting data are transmitted electrically.  
 
Although there have been such reforms in the Philippines, the people still do not have 
full confidence in their elections. One reason is that the effects of these reforms have 
been limited in certain types of fraud. There are other types, like vote buying, 
intimidation, disenfranchisement from various stages of elections, which cannot be 
controlled by quick counts and automation. Since automated counting was introduced, 
citizen’s groups have shifted their activities from quick counts to voter education and 
checking on fraud outside of counting. While these activities are useful, the ability of 
private groups to regulate fraud is restricted as they do not have cohesive power. Vote 
automation has also faced criticism as it still suffers from irregularities18.  
 
The reforms to establish an autonomous and capable electoral administration system in 
the Philippines have not moved forward strongly because the major players who can 
participate in designing the institutions of the electoral administration do not have the 
incentives to bring about such an administration.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
The nature of the strong NEC in Korea was initially decided at the point of democratic 
transition. It constituted the equilibrium in the interaction between President Roh 
Tae-woo, the ruler, and the opposition, as the opposition’s threat was credible. A strong 
NEC has continued to exist because it also works to the major players incentives in the 
                                                                                                                                                     
the numbers of votes based on the tally sheets. 
18 See CenPEG [2010] for problems in the actual operation of automation.  
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unsynchronized election cycles which eventually led to divided government and 
lowered the “stakes of politics”. The nationalization of political competition also 
augmented the incentive structure to sustain a strong NEC.  
 
On the other hand, the weak COMELEC was not reformed at the point of democratic 
transition because President Marcos, the ruler, needed to rig elections. COMELEC did 
not change even after democratization. The major players in the new democratic period 
have not had the incentives to reform COMELEC because of the term limit on the 
president, the cleavage in the Senate and localized competition, and the “high stakes of 
politics” for members of the House of Representatives. Only a half-way compromise 
of citizen’s group monitoring has been strengthened.   
 
The cases of Korea and the Philippines confirm that the incentive structure of the 
major players matters in deciding the nature of the electoral administration system. The 
ruler has the incentive to establish an autonomous and capable electoral administration 
system for revealing information about elections if the threat of the opposition’s protest 
is credible, if the information on the nature of elections is crucial for the opposition’s 
protest, and if the ruler’s payoff will be heavily affected by opposition protest. 
Furthermore, an autonomous and capable electoral administration system will be 
sustained if the major players find that fair elections benefit them in the long run. The 
“stakes of politics”, the fundamental factor for self-enforcing democracy, matters in 
fair elections too because establishing an autonomous and powerful electoral 
administration system is one of the major conditions for political stability in 
democracy.  
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Appendix 
 
The theoretical framework of this study is constructed as followings.  
 
Suppose that controlling power in the state produces utility V, and that there are two 
players, the ruler and the opposition. If there is no fair electoral administration, the 
election game can be expressed as follows.  
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Figure 1 Election Game without Fair Electoral Administration 
 
Source: Authors 
 
The ruler has a strategy set 𝑆𝑅 ∈ {hold fair elections, rig elections}. The opposition 
has a strategy set 𝑆𝑂 ∈ {acquiesce if the ruler wins, protest if the ruler wins}. The ruler 
wins in fair elections with the probability 𝑞 ∈ [0, 1] , while he loses with the 
probability (1 − 𝑞) ∈ [0, 1]. The ruler wins in rigged elections with the probability 
𝑟 ∈ [0, 1], while he loses in rigged elections with the probability (1 − 𝑟) ∈ [0, 1]. 
Since there is no fair electoral administration, the opposition does not know the nature 
the ruler the opposition 
Outcome A 0 V
the ruler loses Outcome B V 0
1-q acquiesces
holds fair elections p
the ruler wins
The Ruler q protests Outcome C V-D B-C-E
Chance The Opposition
acquiesces Outcome D V-F 0
the rule wins
r
1-p
protests
rigs elections
the ruler loses Outcome E V-F-D B-C
1-r
Outcome F -F V
Payoffs
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of the elections. If the ruler wins, the opposition believes that the elections were fair 
with the probability 𝑝 ∈ [0, 1], while it believes that the elections were rigged with the 
probability (1 − 𝑝) ∈ [0, 1]. The payoffs for each player for possible outcomes are 
provided in the figure. Here, F is the cost of fraud; D is the damage caused by the 
opposition’s protest; B is the benefits gained through protesting; C is the cost of 
protesting; and E is the cost caused by misjudging the nature of the elections.  
 
The strategy profile to induce outcome A or C is: 
σR = hold fair elections 
σO = protest if the ruler wins 
This constitutes equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied. 
𝑝 < 𝐵 − 𝐶
𝐸
 
-------------------------------------------- (a) 
(the condition that causes the opposition’s protest.) 
𝑞 > 𝑟 − 𝐹
𝑉 − 𝐷
 
-------------------------------------------- (b) 
(the condition that makes the ruler hold fair elections even if the opposition protests) 
 
 
If an autonomous electoral administration were introduced, the path to Outcome C 
would be eliminated. Furthermore, if the electoral administration is strong enough to 
prevent fraud, paths to outcomes D, E, and F would also be eliminated. In such a case, 
the expected payoff for the ruler would always be 𝑞 ∙ 𝑉 . Apparently the ruler’s 
expected payoff increases.  
 
(Provided that 2∙𝑟∙𝐹
𝑉
> 𝐹
𝑉−𝐷
 helds. Otherwise, condition (b) should be replaced 
by 𝑞 > 𝑟 − 2∙𝑟∙𝐹
𝑉
) 
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Hence, if conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied, the ruler has the incentive to establish a 
fair electoral administration. In the case of condition (b), the threshold for holding fair 
elections would get lower as the stakes of the politics, V, decreases. 
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